Abstract: An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value is given. It is based on a version of three axioms, which are common to all the semi-values, and on an additional reduction axiom.
Introduction
A lot of effort had been devoted to the research of the semi values of games [2] , especially to the Shapley-value. An axiomatization was given to the Shapley value [6] , and to the Banzhaf value [3, 4] .
The axiomatization given in [4] is based on the tool of the compound game and it does not determine the Banzhaf value uniquely. The axiomatization given in [3 ] treats a different approach. It is based on four axioms, three of them are standard and in fact determine the semi values [2] . We adopt here these three axioms.
We replace the fourth axiom of [3] by some reduction axiom, which has an intuitive meaning. This axiom says something about the value of a game in terms of another game, with smaller number of players.
It is worthwhile to mention that the use of such axioms is common in axiomatization of solution concepts (see for example: in [5] an axiomatization of the prekernel, and in [7] an axiomatization of the prenucleolus).
We define here for each coalition T two T-games derived from the original game by amalgamting all the players of T to one player called T. Our additional axiom says that for any two-players-coalition T = (i, ]} the sum of the values of i and off in the original game is less or equal to the value of IF in the T-games. According to this axiom a unification of any two players is profitable.
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The main significance of the following axiomatization is the indication of the difference between the Banzhaf value and the Shapley value. For example take the three
,1]
player weighted majority game 1 ; 3' 3' 3 ; its Banzhaf value is ' 4' while its Shapley value is ' 3' 3 " After amalgamating players 1 and 2 to a new player we will get the game 1;3, = 1 2' The Banzhaf value and the Shapley value coincide on the two player games and they are equal in this particular game to
[1 1\ 1 1 1 1 1 l /5)2' . Notice that ~+~<2, while -+ >2 3 3 -. In other words, in this case according to the Shapley value unification is harmful while according to the Banzhaf value unification is never harmful, and in some cases it is profitable.
2 Definitions, the Axiom Systems, and Theorems Before introducing the axioms we need several notations. A game in eoafitionalfunction form is a pair (iV, v) where N is a finite set of players and v is a real valued function defined on the subsets of N and v(r = 0. A simple game is a game (N, v) where v is ranged to {0, 1 }. In a simple game all the coalitions S C N with v(S) = 1 are called winning and all the rest losing.
A monotonic game is a game (N, v) 
which satisfies the condition whereby S C T implies v(S) <~ v(T).
Let TC_N, iNI = n the T-unanimity game denoted by U~-= (N, u})is defined to be u~ ( (1)
